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Abstract
This paper studies convergence and stability properties of Sjo¨stro¨m’s
(1994) mechanism, under the assumption that boundedly rational players
find their way to equilibrium using monotonic learning dynamics and best-
reply dynamics. This mechanism implements most social choice functions
in economic environments using as a solution concept one round of dele-
tion of weakly dominated strategies and one round of deletion of strictly
dominated strategies. However, there are other sets of Nash equilibria,
whose payoffs may be very different from those desired by the social choice
function. With monotonic dynamics, all these sets of equilibria contain
limit points of the learning dynamics. Furthermore, even if the dynamics
converge to the “right” set of equilibria (i.e. the one which contains the
solution of the mechanism), it may converge to an equilibrium which is
worse in welfare terms. In contrast with this result, any interior solution
of the best-reply dynamics converges to the equilibrium whose outcome
the planner desires.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: C72, D70, D78.
KEYWORDS: Implementation Theory, Evolutionary Dynamics, Bounded Ra-
tionality.
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1 Introduction
The theory of implementation studies the problem of designing decentralized
institutions (“mechanisms”) through which certain socially desirable objectives
can be achieved. These social arrangements should be able to operate in a wide
variety of environments, without extensive knowledge by the planner about
the agents’ preferences. Once it is ensured that agents respect the rules of
the mechanism, these rules are designed so that it is in the best interest of
agents to take those actions that lead to the socially desirable outcome. More
precisely, a social choice rule is implemented by a (game-form) mechanism if, for
every possible environment (preference profile), the solution (set of equilibrium
outcomes) of the mechanism coincides with the set of outcomes of the social
choice rule.
This definition implicitly assumes that agents are always able to play equi-
librium strategies. However, there is substantial empirical and experimental
evidence against this theoretical presumption. What we learn from experiments
is that subjects usually fail to play an equilibrium, unless they are given the
chance to acquire enough experience through repeated play. Furthermore, for
some games, players may still fail to play an equilibrium, even with experience,
specially if the equilibrium notion is fairly refined.1
In spite of this evidence, research in implementation theory has paid little
attention to the problem of how equilibrium is achieved.2 One of the reasons
is that, in describing the mechanism to the agents, the planner has always the
option of explaining the reasons why the required actions correspond to “the
obvious way to play” the mechanism, (that, is, why it is in the best interest of
agents to follow the social rule dictat). However, since the planner should be
concerned with the performance of the mechanism when some (if not all of the)
agents are not as “rational” as expected, it is useful to test the mechanism’s
performance in the presence of some form of bounded rationality.
A more fundamental approach to these issues would require the planner to
take bounded rationality into account, when designing the game agents play.
This necessarily leads to an alternative definition of implementation which in-
cludes, among the variables which specify the “environment”, the learning pro-
tocols agents use, as well as initial conditions of the learning process. In this
respect, we propose the following definition: a social choice rule is dynamically
implemented by a mechanism if, for every possible environment, the limiting
set of outcomes, when the game is played repeatedly, coincides with the set of
outcomes of the social choice rule.
1See Cooper et al. (1991) for the prisoner’s dilemma, a strictly dominance solvable game;
McKelvey and Palfrey (1991) for the centipede game, a game with a unique Nash equilib-
rium; and Gu¨th et al. (1982) for the ultimatum game, which has a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium.
2Noticeable exceptions are the papers of Muench and Walker (1984), Walker (1984), Jordan
(1986), Vega-Redondo (1989), De Trenqualye (1988,1989) and Cabrales (1997).
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There is a caveat here. Why should we focus only on limiting outcomes?
The planner may also care about what happens on the way to equilibrium, as
the learning path may include outcomes significantly different than what the
choice rule prescribes. This, in turn, would require to fully characterize the
planner’s preferences, rather than specify the most preferred outcome, for any
given state of the environment. This is something the implementation literature
traditionally leaves unspecified, as it has focused on implementing “exactly”,
that is, designing games that produce the most desired outcomes in all states
of the world. The main advantage of this approach is that it avoids the thorny
problem of having “ad-hoc” preferences for the planner. Moreover, if the planner
does not discount the future and the game is played infinitely often, then it is
legitimate to look at limiting outcomes. This would be the case, for example, if
we consider the planner as the writer of a constitution which is concerned about
the welfare of many generations of users, each of those being equally important.
In this paper we study the dynamic implementation of Sjo¨stro¨m’s (1994)
mechanism3. First, we study the performance of the mechanism under mono-
tonic dynamics (Samuelson and Zhang 1992, Weibull 1995), which essentially
imply higher growth rates for those strategies which perform better.4 We also
study the mechanism under best-reply dynamics (Matsui, 1992), a limiting case
of monotonic dynamic by which only strategies that are a best response to
the current mixed strategy profile grow. This choice of dynamics allows us to
understand the effects of increasing levels of responsiveness to past payoffs of
the players (which could be interpreted as a proxy for “sophistication”) on the
performance of the mechanism.
We concentrate on Sjo¨stro¨m’s mechanism for several reasons. First, the con-
ditions for implementation are quite weak. Although the environments that are
permitted are not universal, they are rich enough for most economic purposes.
Furthermore, this reduction in the domain allows the author to implement the
social choice rule with a “bounded” game, that is, a game which does not exploit
equilibrium nonexistence to rule out undesirable outcomes.5 Finally, the game
can be solved by one round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies, and then
another round of deletion of strictly dominated strategies. This feature of the
mechanism makes it particularly attractive since, under some assumptions of
3Sjo¨stro¨m’s (1994) mechanism and the one proposed by Jackson et al. (1994) for separable
environments are very similar. Most of our results would generalize easily for that mechanism
as well.
4One particularly well known member of the family of monotonic dynamics is the so-called
replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory (Taylor and Jonker, 1978). These dynamics
have been given a learning theoretic foundation by Bo¨rgers and Sarin (1997), and they can
also be interpreted as a model of imitation (Schlag, 1994).
5For example, in the canonical mechanism for Nash implementation (Repullo, 1987), if
agents disagree widely on the announced preferences, they have to play a game in which the
agent announcing the highest integer wins a prize. Jackson (1992) provides a good treatment
of this issue.
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asymptotically stable when the system is slightly perturbed. Given the failure of
asymptotic stability without perturbations, one would expect any perturbation
to move the system away from the unstable component and the weakly domi-
nated strategy to become extinct. Proposition 6 tells us that evolutionary game
theory does not provide a ground for such a claim. The intuition here is similar
to the one in Gale et al. (1995). When there is drift, strategies against which
the weakly dominated strategy does poorly will have positive weight at all times
and, therefore, the part of the dynamics that depends on payoffs pushes against
the dominated strategy. On the other hand, drift may provide a direct push in
favor of the dominated strategy (and more crucially, in favor of those strategies
of the other players which do well against the dominated strategy). When the
balance between these two forces is right, one gets a stable equilibrium with
non-negligible weight for the dominated strategy.
6 Best-Reply Dynamics and Sjo¨stro¨m’s Mech-
anism
In this section, we consider an alternative scenario. Suppose that x(t) evolves
according to the following dynamics:
x˙ = BR(x) − x (9)
with BR(x) denoting the mixed strategy best-reply correspondence BR : ∆ 7→
∆. This alternative dynamic defines a (continuous-time) version of the classic
best-reply dynamics, often proposed as an alternative learning model to the
evolutionary dynamics studied hereto. We can give two interpretations to (9).
Following Matsui (1992), we can use (9) to approximate the evolution of an
infinite population of players who occasionally update their strategy, selecting
a best reply to the current population state x(t).14 Alternatively, (9) can be
regarded as the continuous-time limit (up to a reparametrization of time) of the
well known fictitious play dynamic.15 This dynamic accounts for the evolution
of players’ beliefs, when these beliefs follow the empirical frequencies with which
each pure strategy profile has been played (and perfectly observed) in the past,
and agents select, at each point in time, a pure strategy among those which
maximize their expected payoff, given their current beliefs.
14See also Gilboa and Matsui (1991).
15Firstly introduced by Brown (1951) as an algorithm to compute Nash equilibria, fictitious
play has been recently re-interpreted as a learning model in the works of Fudenberg and Kreps
(1993). Milgrom and Roberts (1990) extend some of the properties of fictitious play to the
more general class of adaptive learning dynamics. We prefer here the non-standard version
in continuous-time to be consistent with the rest of the paper. Nevertheless, in an earlier
version of this paper we prove that the same results still hold if the dynamics are defined in
discrete-time.
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Notice that, for some x ∈ ∆, BR(x) can take infinitely many values. Thus,
uniqueness of the solution of (9) is not guaranteed. However, since BR(x) is
upper-hemicontinuous with closed and convex values, it can be shown16 that the
differential inclusion x˙ ∈ BR(x)−x has at least one (interior) solution x(t, x(0)),
which is Lipschitz continuous and defined, for any t ≥ 0.
We begin by characterizing the asymptotics of (9) in the case of Sjo¨stro¨m’s
example, that is, game G.
Proposition 7 Any interior solution x(t, x(0)) of (9) converges to (1,1, 1).
Proof. Since m03 is weakly dominated by m
1
3, we have x˙3 = 1−x3, for any inte-
rior solution x(t, x(0)) of (9). This in turn implies limt→∞ x3(t) = 1. Moreover,
for any 0 < ε < 1/2, there exists some T (ε) such that x3(t) ≥ 12 + ε, for any
t ≥ T (ε). We evaluate T (ε) explicitly:
T (ε) =
{
0ifx3(0) >
1
2
+ εlog
[
1− x3(0)
1/2− ε
]
ifx3(0) ≤ 1
2
+ ε (10)
By virtue of (10), T (ε) < ∞, for ε sufficiently small. Since BR(x(t)) =
(1, 1, 1) for any t ≥ T (ε), any interior solution of (9) is characterized by the
following system of differential equations:
x˙i(t) = 1− xi(t), i = 1,2, 3; (11)
for t sufficiently large. This, in turn, implies limt→∞ xi(t) = 1, i = 1, 2, 3.
Similar considerations hold for the general mechanism. By analogy with (2-
3), let Ŝi = {mi ∈Mi
∣∣∣Rii = R̂i }, with ŝi = {mi ∈ Ŝi ∣∣∣Rii−1 = R̂i−1, Rii+1 = R̂i+1 }
denoting the pure Nash equilibrium in which all agents consistently reveal
their true preferences (i.e. the “solution” of Γ given the true preference
profile R̂). For any given arbitrary preference profiles R ∈ Φ, with R 6= R̂,
mi = {mi /∈ Ŝi
∣∣Rii−1 = Ri−1,Rii+1 = Ri+1 } is weakly dominated by m̂i =
{mi ∈ Ŝi
∣∣Rii−1 = Ri−1, Rii+1 = Ri+1 }, which in turn implies that, for any inte-
rior solution x(t, x(0)) of (9)
lim
t→∞
x
m′i
i (t) = 0. (12)
for any mi /∈ Ŝi. Let ∆̂ denote the face of ∆ spanned by the restricted game
(Γ, R̂)
∣∣∣×Ŝi . An implication of (12) is that ∆̂ is globally interior attracting for the
best-reply dynamics (9), as it contains the set of undominated mixed strategies.
Consider now the following system of differential equations:
16See Aubin and Cellina (1984), Chapter 2. On the stability properties of (9) see Hofbauer
(1997).
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x˙mii (t) = 1− xmii (t), mi = ŝi
x˙mii (t) = −xmii (t), mi 6= ŝi
(13)
Since, for all i, ŝi is the unique best reply for player i in the restricted
game (Γ, R̂)
∣∣∣×Ŝi , (13) defines the unique solution of (9) for (not necessarily
interior) trajectories starting from ∆̂ and, therefore, for any interior trajectory
(9) starting from ∆, for t sufficiently large. We have just proved
Proposition 8 Any interior solution of (9) converges to ŝi.
For best-reply dynamics we have shown that every interior solution con-
verges to the unique equilibrium whose outcome is the one the planner wants
to implement. This is so because completely mixed initial beliefs make the
weakly dominated strategies in which agents lie about their own type subopti-
mal. Furthermore, since initial beliefs are completely mixed, they will always
be completely mixed, so these weakly dominated strategies will always remain
suboptimal, will never be played and their weight in beliefs will eventually van-
ish. This implies that nonequilibrium strategies by which agents misrepresent
their neighbors’ preferences become also suboptimal, and agents will learn not
to use them.
The results obtained here are so different from those we derived in the previ-
ous sections essentially because the difference in growth rates between two pure
strategies, in the case of the best-reply dynamics (9), need not satisfy Lipschitz
continuity. The only strategies with a positive growth rate are best responses;
this implies that there is an infinite response of growth rates to changes in the
sign of the differences in payoffs, which is precisely what Lipschitz continuity
rules out.
To understand the effects of increasing levels of responsiveness to payoffs on
the performance of the mechanism, consider the following (monotonic) dynam-
ics:
x˙mii = x
mi
i
 exp[σui(mi, x−i)]∑
mk∈Mi
xmki exp[σui(mk, x−i)]
− 1
 (14)
The dynamic (14) has been proposed by Bjo¨rnerstedt and Weibull (1996)
to approximate the evolution of a population of agents who revise their pure
strategy imitating at random other agents in the same player position; the more
successful is strategy mi given the current population state (i.e. the higher is
ui(mi, x−i)), the higher is the probability of mi being imitated (i.e. the higher is
x˙mii ).
17 Given the functional form (14), we can interpret σ as a “responsiveness”
17On the evolutionary properties of (14), see also Weibull (1995) and Hofbauer and Weibull
(1996).
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the performance of these mechanisms with this type of agents, a necessary step
before mechanisms are used in real life.
Further empirical study is at least as necessary. It would, for example,
help to answer the question about which of the dynamics assumptions is more
appropriate. In this sense, there is already some evidence on mechanism de-
sign and learning algorithms. Chen and Tang (1996) have done experiments
with the Basic Quadratic mechanism by Groves and Ledyard (1977) and the
Paired-Difference mechanism by Walker (1981). They estimate different learn-
ing models using experimental data, showing that variants of stimulus-response
learning algorithms (whose expected law of motion is the replicator dynamics)
outperform the generalized fictitious play model. This is also consistent with the
good performance that Roth and Erev (1995) show for stimulus-response learn-
ing algorithms in mimicking the behavior of a range of experimental data, which
includes other weakly dominance solvable games, like the ultimatum game.18
But even more importantly, the empirical and experimental work would
help to design games with good convergence properties to the preferred social
outcome, by revealing how people adjust their play in games like that studied
in this paper, as well as in other mechanisms proposed by the literature. We
have already begun to do such experimental studies.
18In their paper, Roth and Erev (1995) show that these dynamics explain the data sig-
nificantly better, according to quadratic deviation measures and others, than a generalized
fictitious play model which can accommodate behaviors ranging from fictitious play to best
response dynamics by the estimation of a “forgetfulness parameter” which weights past infor-
mation. For the experimental evidence on learning rules, see also Tang (1996), Chen et al.,
forthcoming, and Mookherjee and Sopher (1996).
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We already noticed that agent 3 has a weakly
dominated strategy (namely, m03). In particular, m
1
3 (truth-telling) makes agent
3 (strictly) better off than m03 (lying), unless agents 1 and 2 coordinate their
actions completely, that is, unless they play m0i i = 1, 2 with probability 1
or they play m1i i = 1,2 with probability 1, (in which case, 3 is completely
indifferent). This leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 1 No strategy profile in which x3 ∈ (0,1) can be a Nash equilibrium
unless x1 = x2 = 1 or x1 = x2 = 0, that is, unless agents 1 and 2 play the same
strategy with probability 1.
With this in mind, we construct the proof as follows: we fix the mixed
strategy of player 3 and check which mixed strategies for player 1 and 2 can
sustain a Nash equilibrium. Noting that
∆Π1 ≡ u1(m11, x) − u1(m01, x) =
1
12
(x2(x3 − 1) + 7x3 − 3) (15)
∆Π2 ≡ u2(m12, x) − u2(m02, x) =
1
12
(x1(x3 − 1) + 7x3 − 3) (16)
we can make the following observations:
a) When x3 <
3
7 , m
0
i (lying) yields a strictly higher payoff than m
1
i for both 1
and 2, independently of what the other player does. Therefore, strategy profiles
in NE0 (and only those) are Nash equilibria.
b) When x3 =
3
7 , m
0
1 yields a strictly higher payoff than m
1
1 unless x2 =
0, and x2 = 0 makes player 1 indifferent between m
0
1 and m
1
1 (a symmetric
argument holds for player 2). This excludes the possibility of
(
1,1, 37
)
being
a Nash equilibrium of the game, leaving
(
0,0, 37
) ∈ NE0 as the unique Nash
equilibrium when x3 =
3
7 .
c) When x3 ∈
(
3
7 ,
1
2
)
there are no Nash equilibria. The reason is that, in
this case, if x1 = 1, the best response of player 2 is x2 = 0; if x1 = 0, the best
response for player 2 is x2 = 1. However, neither (0, 1, x3) nor (1,0, x3) can be
Nash equilibria when x3 ∈
(
3
7 ,
1
2
)
by Lemma 1.
d) x3 =
1
2 . By analogy with the case where x3 =
3
7 , it is an implication of
Lemma 1 that
(
1, 1, 12
) ∈ NE1 is the unique Nash equilibrium when x3 = 12 .
e) When x3 >
1
2 announcing m
1
i (truth-telling) is optimal for i = 1 and 2,
independently of what the other player does. Thus, strategy profiles in NE1
(and only those) will be Nash equilibria.
Since this exhausts all cases the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 2. To prove the proposition, it is enough to show that
any interior trajectory converges. The reason is that, once convergence has been
proved, we can apply the standard result “convergence implies Nash under any
monotonic selection dynamics” (see, e.g. Weibull, 1995, Theorem 5.2 (iii)).
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We start by observing that the dynamic is forward invariant. This implies
that xi(t) is always defined and positive, for any nonnegative t. By monotonicity,
x3(t) is also a positive, increasing function of t and bounded above by 1 (since
m13 is a weakly dominant strategy). Therefore, x3(t) must converge (this already
implies convergence of player 3’s mixed strategy). Let x∗i≡ limt→∞ xi(t), when
such a limit exists. Three alternative cases have to be discussed:
a) x∗3 = 0. If x
∗
3 = 0 there must be a time t
′ such that x3(t) < 37 for t > t
′.
This implies that there is a k > 0 such that for all t′ > t, ∆Πi(x(t)) < −k for
i = 1, 2. This implies, by monotonicity, limt→∞ xi(t) = 0 for i = 1, 2, thus
x∗ = (0,0, 0).
b) x∗3 = 1. By a similar argument, monotonicity implies x
∗ = (1, 1, 1).
c) x∗3 ∈ (0, 1) . We want to prove that x∗3 cannot converge to a value within
this range unless the system converges to a Nash equilibrium. To do so (given
the special features of our example) it is enough to show that, if x∗3 ∈ (0, 1), then
both players 1 and 2 select, in the limit, the same pure strategy. Given that this
implies convergence of the full mixed strategy profile, the result follows. More
formally, what we need to prove is contained in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 If x∗3 ∈ (0, 1) then:
either
x∗i = 0, i = 1,2(CASE 0hereafter)
or
x∗i = 1, i = 1, 2.(CASE 1)
Proof. Assume, for the purpose of contradiction, that neither of the above
statements is true. In this case, there must exist a sequence {tk}∞k=1 and a
positive constant ²> 0 such that either xi(tk) > ², i = 1, 2 or xi(tk) < 1− ², i =
1, 2 for all k (in other words, assume that the system stays infinitely often
an ² away from the faces of ∆ in which player 1 and 2 play the same pure
strategy). We already noticed that these are the only faces of ∆ in which both
pure strategies for player 3 yield the same payoff. If the system stays away
from these faces infinitely often along the solution path, then the integral of the
payoff difference ∆Π3(x(t)) goes to infinity as t goes to infinity.
To show this, notice that ∆Πi(x(t)) is a continuous function of x(t) defined
over a compact set (∆). In the case of player 3, such function takes the following
form:
∆Π3(x(t)) ≡ (x1(t) − x2(t))
2
+ x1(t)(1− x1(t)) + x2(t)(1− x2(t))
6
(17)
Take gM ≡ maxi∈I,x−i∈∆−i [|gi(mi, x−i(t))|], i.e. the highest possible growth
rate (in absolute value) over all strategies and players (we know a max exists,
since also gi(.) is continuous in ∆). Then define τ1, τ2, τ3 and τ4 as follows:
τ1 solves ² exp [−gM τ1] = ²2 (i.e. τ1 = ln[2]gM );
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τ2 solves (1− ²) exp [−gMτ2] = ²2 (i.e. τ2 =
ln[−2+ 2² ]
gM
);
τ3 solves ² exp [gM τ3] = 1− ²2 (i.e. τ3 =
ln[− 12+ 1² ]
gM
);
τ4 solves (1− ²) exp [gMτ4] = 1− ²2 (i.e. τ4 =
ln[ 2−²2−2² ]
gM
).
Let ∂τ ≡ min[τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4] be the lower bound for the time interval in which,
after each tk,
²
2 < xi < 1 − ²2 , i = 1, 2 and therefore ∆Π3(x(t)) still remains
bounded away from 0 (i.e. ∆Π3(x(t)) >
²(1− ²2 )
3 > 0, ∀t ∈ [tk, tk + ∂τ ]). Denote
by G² =
{
x ∈ ∆|∆Π3(x) ≥ ²(1−
²
2 )
3
}
. Now define γi(x(t)) the time derivative of
the log of the ratio between the probabilities with which each of player i’s pure
strategies are played, which can be expressed in terms of the difference in the
growth rates:
γi(x(t)) ≡ ∂
∂t
ln
(
xi(t)
1− xi(t)
)
=
x˙i(t)
xi(t)
− (1− x˙i(t))
1− xi(t)
=
x˙i(t)
xi(t)− (xi(t))2
Also γ3(x(t)) is a positive number bounded away from 0 infinitely often since,
by assumption d.1, is a continuous function of x(t) defined on a compact set,
which preserves the same sign of ∆Π3(x(t)). This implies that we can always
define a constant g² = minx∈G² γ3(x(t)), with g² > 0 by assumption d.2. Also
by assumption d.2, γ3(x(t)) > g² ⇐⇒ ∆Π3(x(t)) > ²(1−
²
2 )
3 . If we integrate the
value of γ3(x(t)) over time we then obtain:
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
γ3(x(t))dt ≥
∞∑
k=1
∫ tk+∂τ
tk
γ3(x(t))dt > g²
∞∑
k=1
∫ tk+∂τ
tk
dt = ∞
which implies that x∗3 = 1, which leads to a contradiction.
To summarize, Lemma 2 shows that, if x∗3 ∈ (0, 1) , x1(t) and x2(t) must
converge (and therefore x(t) must converge to a Nash equilibrium). Since this
exhausts all cases the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 3. We begin by noting that, against any m−i ∈M−i, all
strategies mi ∈ Si yield the same payoff, as they only differ in i’s announcement
about herself. Since supp[x−i] ⊆ S−i, totally inconsistent states (the only states
where announcements about i′excluded.
For all xˆi, such that xˆ
mi
i > 0 only if mi ∈ Si we have,
ui(xˆi, x−i) ≥ Πj 6=ixm
∗
j
j vi(fi(φ(i,R
∗)), Rˆi) + (1 − Πj 6=ixm
∗
j
j )vi(0, Rˆi).
For all x¯i 6= xˆi,
ui(x¯i, x−i) ≤
∑
mi∈Si
x¯mii ui(xˆi, x−i)+
(
1−
∑
mi∈Si
x¯mii
)[
Πj 6=ix
m∗j
j vi(0, Rˆi) + (1 −Πj 6=ix
m∗j
j )Uin
]
.
Then
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ui(xˆi, x−i) − ui(x¯i, x−i) ≥
(
1−∑mi∈Si x¯mii ) [Πj 6=ixm∗jj (vi(fi(φ(i, R∗)), Rˆi)− vi(0, Rˆi))
+(1 − Πj 6=ixm
∗
j
j )(vi(0, Rˆi)− Uin)
]
,
which is greater than zero since, by (4),
Πj 6=ix
m∗j
j ≥ Πj 6=ikj ≥
Uin − vi(0, Rˆi)
vi(fi(φ(i, R∗)), Rˆi)− vi(0, Rˆi) + Uin − vi(0, Rˆi)
.
The following lemma will be useful in the proof of Proposition 4.
Lemma 3 . Let any mi, m
′
i ∈ Si and xi. Then
gi(mi, x−i)− gi(m′i, x−i) ≥ −2KXi.
Proof.
Let xˆ−i such that xˆ
mj
j = x
mj
j for all mj ∈ Sj\m∗j ; xˆmjj = 0 for all mj ∈ Sj ;
and xˆ
m∗j
j = x
m∗j
j +
∑
mj∈Sj x
mj
j .
Since ui(mi, x−i) = ui(m′i, x−i) for all x−i ∈ S−i, then gi(mi, xˆ−i) =
gi(m
′
i, xˆ−i).
By Lipschitz continuity we have that,
gi(mi, x−i)− gi(mi, xˆ−i) ≥ −K|x−i − xˆ−i| (18)
gi(m
′
i, xˆ−i)− gi(m′i, x−i) ≥ −K|x−i − xˆ−i| (19)
Since gi(mi, xˆ−i) = gi(m′i, xˆ−i) and |x−i − xˆ−i| = Xi, the result follows by
adding up inequalities (18) and (19).
Proof of Proposition 4. By contradiction.
Suppose that a) is the statement that stops being true earliest, that it does
so for agent i and strategy mi ∈ S¯i and that the boundary time is t′. Then it
must be
xmii (t
′)
xmii (0)
= exp[−hgt′] H
x
m∗i
i (0)
.
Notice that, for all t,
Body Math
ui(mi, x−i(t))− ui(m∗i , x−i(t)) ≤ vi(0, Rˆi)Πj 6=ix
m∗j
j (t) + Ui(1 − Πj 6=ix
m∗j
j (t))
−
(
vi(fi(φ(i,R
∗)), Rˆi)Πj 6=ix
m∗j
j (t) + vi(0, Rˆi)(1− Πj 6=ix
m∗j
j (t))
)
= Ui − vi(0, Rˆi)− Πj 6=ixm
∗
j
j (t)
(
vi(fi(φ(i, R
∗)), Rˆi) + Ui − 2vi(0, Rˆi)
)
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Since b) is true for t < t′,
ui(mi, x−i(t))−ui(m∗i , x−i(t)) < Ui−vi(0, Rˆi)−Hn−1
(
vi(fi(φ(i, R
∗)), Rˆi) + Ui − 2vi(0, Rˆi)
)
.
Thus,
ui(mi, x−i(t))− ui(m∗i , x−i(t)) < −hv,
which, by assumption d.2 and the definition of hv and hg, implies that
gi(mi, x−i(t))− gi(m∗i , x−i(t)) < −hg.
Given x
m∗i
i (t
′) ≤ H, if we integrate gi(mi, x−i(t)) − gi(m∗i , x−i(t)) from 0 to t′,
we obtain the following:
xmii (t
′)
xmii (0)
< exp[−hgt′] H
x
m∗i
i (0)
.
This is a contradiction.
Suppose that b) is the statement that stops being true earliest, that it does
so for agent i, and that the boundary time is t′. Then, it must be true that
x
m∗i
i (t
′) = H .
Notice that Lemma 3 implies that, for all mi ∈ Si\{m∗i },
gi(m
∗
i , x−i(t))− gi(mi, x−i(t)) ≥ −2KXi(t). (20)
Since a) holds for t < t′, (20) implies that
gi(m
∗
i , x−i(t))− gi(mi, x−i(t)) > −2K
(
exp[−2hgt] H
2
(x
m∗
i
i (0))
2
Xi(0)
)
≥ −2K
(
exp[−2hgt] H
2
(x
m∗
i
i (0))
2
X(0)
)
.
By integration,
x
m∗i
i (t
′)
xmii (t
′)
xmii (0)
x
m∗i
i (0)
> exp
[
−2KX(0)
2hg
H2
(x
m∗i
i (0))
2
]
≥ L
Adding over all strategies in Si,
x
m∗i
i (t
′)
x
m∗i
i (0)
>
xSii (t
′)
xSii (0)
L =
1− xS¯ii (t′)
1− xS¯ii (0)
L ≥ L
This implies x
m∗i
i (t
′) > H (using the assumption xm
∗
i
i (0) L > H ), which is a
contradiction.
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Suppose that c) is the statement that stops being true earliest, that it does so
for agent i, and that the boundary time is t′. Then it must be x
m∗
i
i (t
′)
x
mi
i (t
′)
=
x
m∗
i
i (0)
x
mi
i (0)
1
L .
By Lemma 3, for all mi ∈ Si\{m∗i },
gi(mi, x−i(t))− gi(m∗i , x−i(t)) ≥ −2KXi(t). (21)
Since a) holds for t < t′, (21) implies that
gi(mi, x−i(t))− gi(m∗i , x−i(t)) > −2K
(
exp[−2hgt] H
2Xi(0)
(x
m∗
i
i (0))
2
)
≥ −2K
(
exp[−2hgt] H2
(x
m∗
i
i (0))
2
X(0)
)
.
By integration,
xmii (t
′)
x
m∗i
i (t
′)
x
m∗i
i (0)
xmii (0)
> exp
[
−2KX0
2hg
H2
(x
m∗i
i (0))
2
]
≥ L.
which implies that
x
m∗i
i (t
′)
xmii (t
′)
<
x
m∗i
i (0)
xmii (0)
1
L
which is a contradiction. Since this exhausts all cases the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) We know, from Proposition 2, that x˙3 > 0 in
any interior point. This implies that, if there is a time t such that ) > 12 for all
t′ ≥ t. From equations (15-16) we have that, whenever x3(t) > 12 , ∆Πi(x) > 0
for players 1 and 2. This implies that, if there is a time t such that x3(t) >
1
2≥ t
for i = 1, 2 and, therefore, x(t) must converge. Since convergence must be to a
Nash equilibrium and x1 and x2 have been increasing, x must converge to NE
1.
To show the stability of NE1 it suffices to show that there is a neighborhood
of NE1 such that, for all x(0) in this neighborhood, there is a time t such that
x3(t) >
1
2 . Let
x3(0) =
1
2
exp
[
−(1 − ²1)(
²21
2 )
12
]
<
1
2
. From (15-16) we also have that −1 < ∆Π(x) < 1 for i = 1,2, thus
exp[−t](1− ²i) < xi(t) < exp[t](1− ²i). (22)
Since ∆Π3(x) ≤ x1(1−x1)6 , (22) implies
x˙3(t)
x3(t)
>
(1− ²1)(exp[−t](1− exp[t](1 − ²1))
6
.
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Thus,
x˙3(t)
x3(t)
>
(1− ²1)(exp[−t]− (1− ²1))
6
>
(1− ²1)(−t+ ²1)
6
.
This implies that
x3(t) > exp
[
(1− ²1)(− t
2
2 + ²1t)
6
]
x3(0).
Note that, for t = ²1,
x3(²1) > exp
[
(1 − ²1)( ²
2
1
2 )
6
]
exp
[
− (1− ²1)(
²21
2 )
12
]
1
2
= exp
[
(1− ²1)( ²
2
1
2 )
12
]
1
2
>
1
2
.
Which is what we wanted to show.
(ii). Assume x3(0) >
3
7 . Since x˙3(t) > 0 for all t, x3(t) must converge.
Furthermore, since x3(0) is larger than
3
7 , x3(t) must converge to a number larger
than 37 . We know that x(t) converges to a Nash equilibrium by Proposition 2.
Since there is no equilibrium in NE0 with x3 >
3
7 , x(t) cannot converge to a
point in NE0. Since x3(0) can be arbitrarily close to
3
7 and therefore to the set
NE0, this set must be unstable.
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof is constructed as follows. We first
characterize the limit of the set of rest points RˆE(β), and then analyze the
stability properties of each of its elements.
We start by observing that, given β ∈ (0,1), any rest point must be com-
pletely mixed, and it also must be x3 > β, as ∆Π3(.) is always positive in the
interior of the state space ∆ (because m03 is a weakly dominated strategy).We
also know, by continuity of the vectorfield with respect to λ, that every limiting
rest point of the dynamic, as λ goes to zero, must lie in the set of restpoints of
the unperturbed dynamic RE (G).
First, we analyze the limit set of rest points under CASE 0. In this case,
both players 1 and 2 play their strategy m0i with probability 1, that is xi = 0,
for i = 1, 2. Setting x˙1 = 0 yields the following equation:
x1
λ
=
12
(
1
2 − x1
)
(1− x1) (3 + x1 − x3(7− x2)) (23)
and an analogous expression can be obtained for x2λ . Denote by x
0
3 a limiting
value in a rest point, if a limit exists, for x3. When the limiting values for x1
and x2 are zero we have:
lim
xi→0λ→0
xi
λ
=
6
(3− 7x03)
(24)
Notice that, in this case, if a rest point exists, it must be x03 <
3
7 , since
xi
λ > 0.
We set x˙3λ = 0,substitute
xi
λ with the expression in (24), solve for x3, and
33
substitute xi, i = 1, 2 and λ by their limiting value of zero. The solutions for x
0
3
take the following form:
xˆ03 =
1 + 7β +
√
1− β(46− 49β)
10
andxˇ03 =
1 + 7β −
√
1− β(46− 49β)
10
Remember that x03 must be a real, positive number, with β < x
0
3 <
3
7 . For the
expression under the square root at the numerator to be nonnegative, it must
be that β ∈
[
0, 23−4
√
30
49 ≈ .0222673
]
, which determines the feasible range for
both roots. Within this interval of values for β, xˆ03
(
xˇ03
)
is a strictly decreasing
(increasing) function of β, which has a minimum and a maximum, whose values
are 15−2
√
30
35 (0) and
2
10
(
15−2√30
35
)
respectively. As β → 23−4
√
30
49 , both solutions
converge to 15−2
√
30
35 .
We now deal with the subset of limiting rest points under CASE 1, i.e. with
limiting values for xi = 1 for i = 1, 2. The equations corresponding to (23-24)
are now the following:
(1 − x1)
λ
=
12
(
x1 − 12
)
x1 (7x3 + x2(1− x3)− 3) (25)
lim
xi→1λ→0
(1 − xi)
λ
=
3
2(2x13 − 1)
(26)
where x13 denotes a limiting value for x3 (if a limit exists). By analogy with
CASE 0, we know from (26) that, if a rest point exists, it must be x13 >
1
2 .
There is a unique feasible solution for x13,∀β ∈ (0,1) which has the following
form:
xˆ13 =
3 + 4β +
√
9− 16β(1− β)
10
.
Following the same procedure for the remaining rest points of the unperturbed
dynamics (i.e. the pure strategy profiles which belong to RE (G) and do not
satisfy either CASE 0 or CASE 1) does not add any element to the limiting set
of rest points of the perturbed dynamics. This should not be surprising, as any
other rest point of the unperturbed replicator dynamics is unstable with respect
to the interior. Since this exhausts all cases, the result follows.
We now move to establish the stability properties of each limiting restpoint
separately. The Jacobian matrix for the dynamic system is as follows:
J(x, λ) =
(1− 2x1)∆Π1 − λ −(1−x1)x1(1−x3)12 (1−x1)x1(7+x2)12−(1−x2)x2(1−x3)
12 (1− 2x2)∆Π2 − λ
(1−x2)x2(7+x1)
12
(1−2x2)(1−x3)x3
6
(1−2x1)(1−x3)x3
6 (1− 2x3)∆Π3 − λ
We analyze CASE 0 first. We know that, in this case, we have two restpoints,
which we call xˆ0 ≡ (0,0, xˆ03) and xˇ0 ≡ (0, 0, xˇ03). We evaluate the Jacobian
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when x1, x2 and λ are equal to their limiting value (i.e. 0). The corresponding
eigenvalues are
{
0,
−3+7x03
12 ,
−3+7x03
12
}
. There are then two (identical) negative
eigenvalues (since any limiting x03 <
3
7 for CASE 0), while the third eigenvalue is
equal to zero. To determine the stability properties of the perturbed system, the
sign of the eigenvalue whose limit is zero becomes crucial given that continuity of
J(.) ensures that the other two will be negative, for any λ sufficiently small. We
now linearize the rest points (as a function of λ) around NE0. We set x˜(λ, δ) ≡(
δ1λ, δ2λ, x
0
3 + δ3λ
)
, where δ ≡ (δ1, δ2, δ3) denotes the vector collecting the
coefficients of the linearized system. We then evaluate the following expression:
φ0(x03, δ) ≡ lim
λ→0
∂ det
(
J(x, λ)
∣∣
x˜(λ,δ)
)
∂λ
We do so because det (J(x, λ)) , which is equal to zero ∀x ∈ NE0, will preserve
the sign of the third eigenvalue, given that the sign of the other two will stay
constant (and negative) when x is sufficiently close to NE0 and λ is sufficiently
small. For CASE 0 we get the following result:
φ0(x03, δ) =
−54 + x03(252 + 294x03) + (δ1+δ2)
(
9 − 39x03 + 63
(
x03
)2 −49 (x03)3)
864
(27)
We first notice that (27) does not depend on δ3. To evaluate sign
(
φ0(x03, δ)
)
we
only need to get estimates of δ1 and δ2, the linear coefficients which measure
the responsiveness of the equilibrium values of xi, i = 1, 2 to small changes in λ.
We do so by setting limλ→0 ddλ D˜(x, λ)
∣∣∣
x˜(λ,δ)
= 0, and solving for
{
δ1, δ2, x
0
3
}
.
There are two alternative set of solutions, each of them corresponds to each of
the restpoints. In particular:
δˇ01 = δˇ
0
2 =
23− 49β − 7
√
1− β(46− 49β)
8
δˆ01 = δˆ
0
2 =
23− 49β + 7
√
1− β(46− 49β)
8
We evaluate the numerator of (27) for both sets of solutions, obtaining the
following expressions:
φˇ(β) =
3
(
−7 + 322 β − 343β2 + (49 β − 23)
√
1− 46 β + 49β2
)
10
(28)
φˆ(β) =
2863 − 147476β + 882882β2 − 1546244β3 + 823543β4 + k
√
146 β + 49β2
1000
(29)
with k =
(
3887− 60123β+165669β2 − 117649β3
)
.
Both φˇ0(β) and φˆ0(β) are plotted in Figure 5. As the diagram shows, φˇ0(β)
is always negative in the domain
[
0, 23−4
√
30
49
]
, whereas φˆ0(β) is not. In conse-
35
quence, xˇ0 is asymptotically stable whereas xˆ0 is not.
Figure 5
Asymptotic stability of the dynamic with drift
We now move on to CASE 1. Here we have a unique rest point, which
we call xˆ1 ≡ (1, 1, xˆ13) .The eigenvalues of the unperturbed dynamics are as
follows:
{
0, 1−2x33 ,
1−2x3
3
}
. As in CASE 0, there are two (identical) negative
eigenvalues (given that x3 >
1
2 ), and the remaining eigenvalue equal to zero.
By analogy with CASE 0, we define x˜(λ) ≡ (1− δ1λ, 1− δ2λ, x03 + δ3λ)and
solve limλ→0 ddλ D˜(x, λ)
∣∣∣
x˜(λ,δ)
= 0 to get estimates of δ. The unique feasible
solution (corresponding to the unique limiting equilibrium), takes the following
form:
δˆ11 = δˆ
1
2 =
3
(
2− 4β3 +
√
9− 16β + 16β2
)
2
The function corresponding to (28-29) takes now the following form:
φˆ1(β) =
24 (−α + (2− 4β)√α)
5
with α = 9−16β. The function φˆ1(β) is also plotted in Figure 5. As the diagram
shows, φˆ1(β) stays negative ∀β ∈ (0, 1) . Thus, xˆ1 is asymptotically stable under
any drift configuration.
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